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Abstract 
The detection of malingering is an area of research that has received increasing attention 
in recent decades. Neuropsychologists in particular are often asked to assess the validity of 
symptoms such as cognitive impairment due to brain injury or toxic chemical exposure. 
Additionally, given the decision of the U.S. Supreme court in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), incentive 
to feign mental retardation in order to avoid capital punishment has greatly increased. However, 
few measures of malingering detection have been thoroughly studied for their applicability to 
mentally retarded individuals, and for their ability to accurately distinguish between malingerers, 
normal controls, and individuals with mental retardation (MR). The current study explores the 
use of the Bender Gestalt Test (BGT), and of the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems in 
particular, as a screening device to determine the validity of claimed intellectual disability. 
Additionally, high- and low-cognitive ability groups were compared on their capacity to 
successfully malinger on the BGT, the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), the Rey Memory 
for Fifteen Items test (MFIT), and the Rey Dot-Counting test (RDCT). Results showed that high- 
and low-cognitive ability malingerers were not significantly different in their malingering 
performances, and both groups performed similarly to effortful responders with mild MR on all 
measures other than RDCT total errors. Also, of the TOMM, MFIT, and RDCT, only the RDCT 
did not misclassify high proportions (>30%) of mild MR participants as malingerers. 
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Introduction 
 Malingering, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4
th
 ed., Text Revision), is ―the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological symptoms‖ in the presence of external incentive, such as monetary gain or the 
evasion of criminal prosecution, and not attributable to mental disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2000). With prevalence rate estimates ranging from 8% in medical contexts, 
to 19% in forensic settings, to upwards of 30% in chronic pain and fatigue cases (Mittenberg, 
Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002), along with the high economic and societal costs associated 
with successful efforts (Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1998; Johnstone & Cooke, 2003; Rohling, 
Langhinrichsen-Rohling, & Miller, 2003), the need to identify episodes of malingering is great. 
Psychological professionals have long-noted the importance of the detection of feigned 
impairment (e.g., Bash & Alpert, 1980; Hunt & Older, 1943), while simultaneously recognizing 
the shortcomings inherent in these processes (Faust, 1991, 1995). Accordingly, hundreds of 
research articles have been authored in relation to various aspects of malingering (Rogers, 1984), 
leading to the development of specific scoring criteria on existing measures such as the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI and MMPI-2; Schretlen & Arkowitz, 1990; 
Shores & Carstairs, 1998; Walters, White, & Greene, 1988), the Halstead-Reitan 
Neuropsychological Test Battery (Goebel, 1983; Heaton, Smith, Jr., Lehman, & Vogt, 1978), the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (Wang, Rogers, Giles, Diamond, Herrington-Wang, & Taylor, 
1997), the Rorschach (Bash & Alpert, 1980; Schretlen, 1988), the California Verbal Learning 
Test (Slick, Iverson, & Green, 2000), and versions of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales 
(WAIS; Bash & Alpert, 1980; Johnstone & Cooke, 2003; Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000; 
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Langeluddecke & Lucas, 2004; Miller, Ryan, Carruthers, & Cluff, 2004). Additionally, entirely 
new measures, such as the Rey Memory for Fifteen Items Test (MFIT; Rey, 1964; in Lezak, 
1995) and Rey Dot Counting Test (Rey, 1941; in Lezak, 1995), the Structured Interview of 
Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992), the Test of Memory Malingering 
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996), and the Green Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, Allen, & Astner, 
1996), have been created for the explicit purpose of detecting feigned impairment. With such 
continuous advances in both theory and instrumentation, academic and practical interests in 
malingering appear to be steadily increasing, much as they did in the previous decade (Sweet, 
King, Malina, Bergman, & Simmons, 2002). 
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Table 1 
Abbreviations Frequently Used in This Thesis 
Acronym Full Name/Description 
 
BGT 
 
Bender Gestalt Test 
CST Competency to Stand Trial 
MR Mental Retardation 
MFIT Rey Memory for Fifteen Items Test 
MMPI Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
PPVT-IIIB Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—3rd Edition, Form B 
 
RDCT Rey Dot Counting Test 
RMI Rarely Missed Index (derived from the WMS-III) 
SVT Symptom Validity Test 
TBI Traumatic Brain Injury 
TOMM Test of Memory Malingering 
WAIS Wechsler Intelligence Scales 
WMS Wechsler Memory Scales 
WMT Green’s Word Memory Test 
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Literature Review 
 Literature searches of such databases as PsycINFO and MEDLINE return results related 
to malingering numbering in the hundreds, if not thousands. Topics range from the malingering 
of pain (Robinson, Myers, Sadler, Riley, III, Kvaal, & Geisser, 1997) to amnesia (Greiffenstein, 
Baker, & Gola, 1994) to hysterical blindness (Theodor & Mandelcorn, 1973). Reviewing the 
findings of such a large body of work would be beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief 
exploration of some of the common themes of malingering research would be useful. As 
previously noted, types of malingering can vary greatly, and so focusing on a specific context 
becomes necessary. This paper, then, will concern itself with the feigning of deficits in a forensic 
setting, and specifically with criminal forensic malingering.  
 Criminal Forensic Malingering. Malingering and litigation are linked in numerous 
circumstances, such as in worker’s compensation hearings related to traumatic brain injury (TBI; 
e.g., Barth, Gideon, Sciara, Hulsey, & Anchor, 1986; Bianchini, Greve, & Love, 2003), toxin 
exposure (Bianchini et al., 2003), and many other conditions. However, in the criminal forensic 
domain, malingering and its research appear largely confined to the areas of competence to stand 
trial (CST), the feigning of mental disorders, and the feigning of cognitive deficits (Rogers & 
Bender, 2003). CST, an idea founded in English common law, has been defined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States (1960) as the defendant having ―sufficient and present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him‖ (p. 
789; in Stafford, 2003). It is one of the more frequently-assessed aspects of mental health in a 
forensic setting, and various landmark legal decisions, such as Jackson v. Indiana (1972) have 
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since been made in relation to it (Stafford, 2003). If found incompetent to stand trial, the 
individual is put into a treatment program to attempt to restore competence. Should such 
restoration be deemed impossible given the guidelines espoused by Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 
individuals are generally committed to civil facilities for treatment and observation, and, if not 
found to be a danger to themselves or others, are released (Stafford, 2003). Establishment of such 
dangers, and of CST in general, is intrinsically linked to the presence or absence of cognitive 
deficits and/or mental disorders. 
 Mental disorders in and of themselves do not automatically alleviate criminal culpability; 
however, they are often a key component of being found incompetent to stand trial, and of 
obtaining a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, hence the incentive to malinger their 
presence. However, unlike CST evaluations, in which a specific mental disorder or cognitive 
deficit is not necessary to be deemed incompetent a defendant and his or her attorney must prove 
the existence of a mental disorder or defect in order to establish legal insanity. This defect or 
disorder must then directly lead to an excusing condition, such as the ―incapacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of one’s actions or to control one’s conduct‖ (p. 385, Goldstein, Morse, & 
Shapiro, 2003). In such cases, malingerers would be those individuals who fabricate 
psychopathology so as to appear insane at the time of the crime’s commission, thereby escaping 
criminal prosecution (Rogers & Bender, 2003). Should the insanity defense be successful, the 
individual is freed of all responsibility for the act in question, although he or she might still be 
committed to a hospital or mental institution for treatment and monitoring (Goldstein, Morse, & 
Shapiro, 2003). 
  
6 
 
 As has been previously stated, the feigning of cognitive deficits can be used as a way of 
establishing a mental defect in hopes of receiving a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, a 
ruling of incompetent to stand trial, or in an attempt to meet partial criteria for a diagnosis of 
mental retardation. Given that the U.S. Supreme court declared, via Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals to be cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore 
unconstitutional, such a diagnosis of retardation would provide powerful incentive for 
individuals charged with capital offenses punishable by death (Brodsky & Galloway, 2003). As 
pointed out by Rogers and Bender (2003), the malingering of cognitive deficits is fundamentally 
different from the malingering of mental disorders in that the individual, rather than fabricate 
psychopathology, must instead exhibit ―effortful failure,‖ thereby convincing the examiner that 
his or her deficits are genuine (p. 119). This paper, while recognizing the importance of CST and 
psychopathological research, will focus instead on this malingering of cognitive deficits.  
  Forensic Evaluation Perspectives. In an effort to examine the different ways in 
which professionals approach examinations of malingering in a forensic setting, Rogers and 
Bender proposed three commonly-adopted perspectives (Rogers & Bender, 2003). The first of 
these perspectives, the intuitional perspective, holds that professionals feel malingering and other 
simulation/dissimulation, such as defensiveness, will be readily identified by clinical judgment 
alone. However, given that clinical judgment has repeatedly been found insufficiently accurate in 
identifying malingerers (Faust, 1991; Guilmette & Giuliano, 1991; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & 
Vogt, 1978), such a perspective is seen as lacking. 
 The second perspective, the standard perspective, has the examiner using traditional, 
well-validated psychological measures such as personality inventories and ability tests in a dual-
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purpose role—the measurement of the intended characteristic(s), and the identification of 
possible feigning (Rogers & Bender, 2003). Much research exists in this perspective, as using 
existent tests eliminates the need to develop entirely new, malingering-specific tools. 
 Because the measurement of cognitive deficits often-times is delegated to 
neuropsychologists—indeed, by some estimates, more than half of psychologists offering 
neuropsychological services have testified at least once in a legal setting, with one in five having 
done so ten or more times (Guilmette, Faust, Hart, & Arkes, 1990)—it is no surprise that many 
existing neuropsychological measures have been examined for their utility in malingering 
detection. Lu, Boone, Cozolino, and Mitchell (2003) found that the Rey-Osterrieth Complex 
Figure Test, a commonly-used neuropsychological test of visuoconstructive abilities and 
memory, was able to provide a sensitivity of 74% when delineating participants with suspect 
effort from controls and those with various forms of memory impairment. Similarly, both 
Tenhula and Sweet (1996) and Forrest, Allen, and Goldstein (2004) found that the Halstead 
Category Test, a measure of abstract reasoning and concept formation, could accurately 
discriminate dissimulators from controls and individuals with brain damage when using certain 
malingering indices. Heaton, Smith, Jr., Lehman, and Vogt (1978) used the entire Halstead-
Reitan battery, a popular neuropsychological tool, along with the MMPI and the WAIS, to 
examine the responses of uncoached/naïve fakers and nonlitigating head-injured patients. While 
malingerers were able to score in the impaired range as instructed, they were differentiated from 
impaired patients with 94-100% accuracy (Heaton et al., 1978). A potential flaw in this study 
was that it contained more predictor variables (37) than subjects (32), and did not include a 
control group, limiting its external validity (Forrest, Allen, & Goldstein, 2004). Goebel (1983) 
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attempted to remedy these shortcomings, and was able to identify impaired versus unimpaired 
individuals with 94.9-97.2% accuracy, depending upon the base rate assumed. However, 
significantly less success was had in differentiating malingerers from non-malingerers. 
Standard measures not specific to neuropsychology have also been adapted by mental 
health practitioners to screen for the simulation of cognitive abilities, foremost among them 
perhaps being the Wechsler series of tests. Johnstone and Cooke (2003) studied the ability of 
incarcerated adolescent offenders, postgraduate students, and research fellows to feign ―mental 
handicap‖ on the WAIS-R, finding that all groups were successfully able to lower their scores to 
the mentally retarded range. However, participants’ results were inconsistent with qualitative 
observations such as the ability to understand complex directions. Killgore and DellaPietra 
(2000) developed a malingering scale for the WMS-III known as the Rarely Missed Index 
(RMI), which consists of six items from the Logical Memory Delayed Recognition subtest of the 
WMS-III that are answered correctly at better-than-chance levels by naïve subjects. Accuracy of 
classification of malingerers and neurologically-impaired patients using the RMI was 98%, with 
sensitivity of 97% and specificity of 100% (Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000). Miller, Ryan, 
Carruthers, and Cluff (2004) found similar accuracy results (95% overall) for the RMI when 
detecting symptom exaggeration in substance-abusing and head trauma groups, while also 
examining the accuracy of a separate index, Vocabulary minus Digit Span (V-DS) on the WAIS-
III. Langeluddecke and Lucas (2004), however, reported accuracy rates of only 75% for the RMI 
when used with litigating head injury referrals in a 28% base rate condition. 
As can be seen, then, the adaptation of standard measures to malingering detection has 
been met with mixed success, and Rogers and Bender (2003) have stated as much. These 
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findings have lead to the more-widespread adoption of the third of Rogers and Bender’s (2003) 
perspectives, the specialized perspective, in which standard testing is paired with measures 
specifically designed to detect feigning. This is the method recommended by Rogers and Bender 
(2003), and one which also adheres to the multi-test malingering detection method espoused by 
Heaton et al. (1978) among others.  
Such malingering-specific tests often rely on three malingering detection strategies 
described by Rogers and Bender (2003)—floor effects, symptom validity testing, and 
performance curves. Measures such as the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) and Rey’s 
Memory for Fifteen Items test (MFIT) make use of floor effects, in which a relatively simple 
task, completable by ≥90% of impaired individuals, is thought by malingerers to be of greater 
difficulty, thereby causing them to perform worse than would individuals with genuine deficits 
(Rogers & Bender, 2003). Limitations exist in that results are only valid for which norms of 
specific types of impairment are known and to which performance by suspected malingerers can 
be compared (Rogers & Bender, 2003). Additionally, as illustrated by Weinborn, Orr, Woods, 
Conover, and Feix (2003) in relation to the TOMM, when floor effects are used in an effort to 
create cut-off scores, specificity is somewhat sacrificed in order to obtain greater sensitivity. 
The TOMM also makes use of a second detection strategy, symptom validity testing 
(SVT), as described by Brady and Lind (1961; in Rogers & Bender, 2003), and first named by 
Pankratz and colleagues (1975, 1983; in Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree, & Bach, 1998) and Binder 
and Pankratz (1987; in Crawford, Stewart, & Moore, 1989). Essentially, SVT is based on the 
premise that should an examinee be given a multiple-choice task, he or she would be expected to 
perform at a certain level by chance alone. If found to be performing significantly below this 
  
10 
 
chance level, it could be assumed that the individual knew the correct answer, and instead gave 
the incorrect response in an attempt to feign impairment (Rogers & Bender, 2003; Rose et al., 
1998). However, given that such below-chance performance is uncommon in malingerers 
(Martin, Hayes, & Gouvier, 1996), SVT measures, while boasting high specificity (i.e., the 
ability to correctly classify individuals without the condition of interest; true negative rate), 
generally have only moderate sensitivity (i.e., the ability to correctly detect the condition of 
interest; true positive rate). 
 Performance curves, the third commonly-used feigning detection strategy, involve the 
concept that individuals should do well on simpler items, and less-well on more difficult items 
(Rogers & Bender, 2003). Malingerers would be thought either not to know of this concept, 
especially were they unaware of item difficulty, or to have trouble maintaining a ―normal‖ 
consistency in their responses, thus producing an abnormal performance curve (Rogers & 
Bender, 2003). Rey’s Dot Counting test (RDCT) makes use of such principles in its malingering 
detection paradigm, as individuals would be expected to produce more errors and require larger 
amounts of time when having to count greater amounts of dots, and when dealing with 
ungrouped as opposed to grouped patterns of dots (Lezak, 1995). 
  Expert Testimony Guidelines. Given the sometimes-limited accuracies of 
standard and malingering-specific measures alike, along with the fact that expert witnesses often 
play key roles in cases involving feigning in criminal settings (Goldstein, Morse, & Shapiro, 
2003), guidelines have been developed concerning such expert testimony. The most binding of 
these guidelines is that espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (1993), in which the Court ruled that expert testimony should be permitted in 
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legal proceedings only when ―the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and…properly can be applied to the facts in issue‖ (in Mossman, 2003). 
Mossman (2003) summarizes a response by Vallabhajosula and van Gorp’s (2001) to the 
proposed Daubert standard as suggesting that any measure used for malingering detection must 
yield a posterior probability of malingering (i.e., accuracy) of 80% when a base rate of 30% is 
assumed; however, Mossman (2003) criticizes this standard as not providing enough 
information, arguing that an infinite combination of sensitivity and specificity values could 
achieve such accuracy.  
Additionally, studies have shown that base rates are fundamentally important in 
malingering detection, although this aspect has at times received little attention in both research 
and practical settings (Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998). Thus, little progress has been made 
in reaching an agreement as to a global accuracy ―standard‖ in terms of admissible expert 
witness testimony and malingering detection results. The only generally-accepted tenet is that, 
given constitutional protections of the rights of the accused, specificity (and thus the avoidance 
of Type I errors) is of greater importance than sensitivity (the avoidance of Type II errors), 
should a trade-off between the two be necessary (Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1997; Reznek, 2005). 
Hence the frequent use of measures such as the TOMM and MFIT, which exhibit excellent 
specificity at the expense of sensitivity (Lezak, 1995; O’Bryant & Lucas, 2006; Reznek, 2005). 
However, continued efforts must be made to increase the sensitivity of current detection 
methods, or to develop new methods that display excellent accuracy in all respects. 
 Malingering in Special Populations. Given these guidelines regarding the accuracy of 
expert testimony, and the level of precision required by malingering detection strategies, it is of 
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the utmost importance that the specific population of interest be as thoroughly identified and 
understood as possible. However, despite this importance, relatively little work has been done 
with special populations in regards to malingering measures. Indeed, while aspects such as race, 
level of education, age, and even psychopathology have been attended to, less work has been 
done in areas such as low intellectual functioning and mental retardation (MR); and that work 
which exists is not always promising. Studying these populations, especially individuals with 
mental retardation, is becoming increasingly important given such rulings as Atkins v. Virginia 
(2002). 
  Mental Retardation and Malingering. Mental retardation, defined by the DSM-
IV-TR (2000) as possessing an IQ ≤70, deficits in at least two areas of adaptive functioning, and 
onset of before 18 years of age, affects an estimated 1-3% of the population (APA, 2000; 
Hodapp & Dykens, 2003). Additionally, an estimated 16% of murder/insanity defendants 
(Lanzkron, 1963; in Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1997), and 2-10% of the prison population as a 
whole (Petersilia, 2000, in Davis, 2000) are thought to have intellectual disabilities (ID; a term 
now used synonymously with MR). These individuals pose unique challenges to mental health 
professionals assessing malingering in forensic populations. Many typical measures of 
malingering detection, such as the MMPI (Keyes, 2004) and the PAI (Morey, 1996), require 
reading ability and levels of insight beyond those possessed by the majority of individuals with 
MR. Other measures, such as the Rarely Missed Index (RMI), have little or no research 
exploring their use, and the development of appropriate norms, with intellectually-disabled 
examinees. As such, the development of measures that are suitable for intellectually-disabled 
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populations, and that can also accurately discriminate between malingered and true cognitive 
deficits, are necessary additions to the existent body of feigning detection tools.  
While commonly-used intelligence tests would be an obvious first choice, little work has 
been done regarding their use in the detection of malingered mental retardation, with interest 
instead focusing largely on feigned brain injury or psychosis (Schretlen, 1988). However, other 
measures have been studied in contexts related to the malingering of mental retardation. The 
MFIT is one example that is simple enough in design and administration to be used with MR 
individuals, and that has also been previously, albeit scarcely, used to examine faked intellectual 
disability. Hayes, Hale, and Gouvier (1998) found that when used with the SIRS, RDCT, and M-
Test, the MFIT (with a cut-off of <9 items correct) lead to correct classification of all 
participants across three groups—pre-trial, not guilty by reason of insanity (NGBRI), and 
malingering. However, when the SIRS was removed from the discriminant function analysis, the 
remaining measures achieved an accuracy of only 59.5%, although this value was significant at 
the .05 level. Misclassification of pre-trial and NGBRI group members as malingerers occurred 
at rates of 23.1% and 27.8%, respectively. Hurley and Deal (2006) found that the SIRS, TOMM, 
and MFIT all misclassified participants of below-average intellectual functioning as malingerers; 
only the RDCT, using a cut-off of greater than 180 seconds total completion time, had a 0% 
false-positive rate. Thus, based on these results, it appears as though with a cut-off of <9 items, 
the MFIT might misclassify non-feigning individuals with MR as malingering at unacceptably 
high levels. However, with lower cut-off scores, it might in fact demonstrate high specificity if 
not sensitivity. Additionally, the previous studies documented shortcomings related to small 
sample size and subject homogeneity, indicating possible areas of future improvement and study.   
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Bender Gestalt Test. Another measure that is appropriate for individuals with mental 
retardation, and that is also commonly-used by clinical psychologists (Groth-Marnat, 2003), but 
which has been infrequently applied to forensic settings, is the Bender Gestalt Test (BGT; 
Bender, 1938). Adapted by Bender from a portion of Wertheimer’s (1923) original designs, the 
BGT is a measure of ―visual-motor integration‖ (Koppitz, 1975) in that it requires examinees to 
visually perceive a series of stimuli, to accurately grasp their ―gestalt‖ properties, and then to 
reproduce the figures. The measure itself consists of nine separate designs, each contained on a 
separate card. No standard instructions are provided or required (Bender, 1938), although 
generally examinees are told to reproduce each design as close to the original as possible; they 
are then provided with an 8 ½ x 11‖ sheet of blank paper, and shown the separate Bender cards 
one at a time. No time limit is imposed, and no specific corrections are to be given other than 
general statements such as ―do your best,‖ or, ―do it the way you think best‖ (Lacks, 1984). 
Behavioral observations should be made during administration, such as the examinees’ rotations 
of cards and/or paper, the general time required for reproduction of each design, any erasures or 
spontaneous corrections, etc. (Bender, 1938; Koppitz, 1975; Lacks, 1984).  
 While Bender (1938) did not advocate, and was in fact skeptical of, the use of 
standardized scoring systems, many have nonetheless been developed. Pascal and Suttell (1951), 
Canter (1968), and Lacks (1984) developed three of the more well-known scoring criteria 
intended for use with adult examinees, while Koppitz (1963, 1975) created the most widely-used 
developmental scoring system for children. All appear to be well-normed, valid, and reliable, 
although the Pascal-Suttell method has been criticized for its intricacy and the length of time 
required to examine profiles (Groth-Marnat, 2003). Additionally, performance on the BGT via 
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many of these scoring systems has been correlated at least moderately with IQ, especially in the 
average and below ranges (Koppitz, 1975). However, while the BGT is still quite popular with 
clinical psychologists, it has fallen out of favor with many neuropsychologists due to the non-
specific nature of results (Groth-Marnat, 2003), which generally are only able to differentiate 
―organic‖ from ―functional‖ impairment. Nonetheless, its brief administration time, simple 
instructions, and non-traditional protocol might be useful to forensic screening applications in 
special populations.  
Bruhn and Reed (1975) examined such applications in their study exploring the ability of 
the Pascal-Suttell and Canter scoring systems in differentiating college student controls, 
individuals told to feign ―brain damage,‖ and individuals pre-determined to have existing organic 
impairment. Their results suggested that neither the Pascal-Suttell nor the Canter method was 
able to successfully separate malingerers from impaired and unimpaired individuals. Bash and 
Alpert (1980) attempted to adapt the malingering of cognitive deficits guidelines first mentioned 
by Bender (1938) to quantitative use. These guidelines indicated that malingers would produce 
small, inhibited designs, would demonstrate uneven performance (i.e., higher-level performance 
on some designs, and lower-level performance on others), would change figure position while 
maintaining pattern properties (e.g., simplifying squares as circles), would maintain gestalt 
function of designs while altering relation or direction of individual parts, would retain the shape 
of a design while simplifying the symbols, and would add extraneous, complex elements to the 
designs. This scoring protocol was able to successfully discriminate between malingerers and 
three control groups, including psychotic (i.e., schizophrenic) and non-psychotic inpatients. 
Schretlen (1988, 1990) successfully revised and expanded the Bash and Alpert (1980) 
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malingering criteria. While uniform discrepancies between genuinely-impaired and malingering 
subjects were not noted, the criteria—via a discriminant function analysis—were able to 
successfully differentiate between malingerers, controls (including non-malingering inmates with 
psychiatric illness), and individuals with mental retardation. False positive rates generally varied 
between 0% and 7.5% overall. However, it should be noted that the mean IQs of the mentally 
retarded groups involved were in the 40-50 range, suggesting moderate rather than mild 
retardation.  
Neither the Koppitz nor Lacks method has been used in the detection of malingered 
mental retardation. However, both would be appropriate for MR populations. The Koppitz 
system, as previously mentioned, is developmental in nature, and thus intended for children. Its 
utility essentially disappears after age 10-12 years, at which point children tend to earn perfect 
scores, although it is useful after that point for individuals whose visuo-perceptual constructive 
abilities are below those of a typical nine year old (Koppitz, 1975). Total scores can range from 
zero to 30, with higher scores indicating greater numbers of errors. Scores are then compared to 
normative data divided into six-month age intervals to determine level of development. Test-
retest reliabilities have ranged from .53 to .90 depending upon the interval between 
examinations, with Koppitz suggesting that some difference would be expected as children 
mature, and that individuals with ―minimal brain dysfunction‖ would be expected to provide 
more reliable scores (Koppitz, 1975). Given that many individuals with intellectual disabilities 
are developmentally immature in relation to their chronological age, it is possible that a 
developmental, child-centered scoring strategy would be more appropriate than one intended 
only for adults when used with ID populations. Also, given that many malingerers might 
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overestimate the difficulty of the test, they would obtain error scores significantly higher than 
those of individuals with MR, with both groups obtaining error scores greater than normal 
controls.  
The Lacks system, conversely, is intended for use with adult participants, and is meant to 
screen for the existence of organic cerebral impairment. It is a restatement, refinement, and 
expansion of the scoring system originally proposed by Hutt and Briskin (1960). Key supports of 
its utility are that scores are obtained quickly, and that novice examiners are generally as 
accurate as experienced professionals when using it (Lacks, 1984). Interrater reliability for total 
error score ranged from .87 to .95, and intrarater reliability was .93. Total scores can range from 
zero to 12, with higher scores indicating more errors; any total score of five or greater is taken to 
indicate the presence of organic impairment or subpar interest and effort. As with the Koppitz 
method, it is possible that malingerers would overestimate the difficulty of the BGT, and thus 
would display significantly more errors than normal controls or MR subjects using the Lacks 
criteria. 
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Statement of Purpose 
Given the relative recency of the Atkins (2002) decision, it should be expected that much 
work remains to be done in studying its repercussions in the legal and mental health 
communities. The ability to examine the effects of this judgment, especially in a malingering 
context, so close to its inception is an amazing opportunity. Additionally, given the need for 
more work in the area of malingering in mental retardation in general, it would behoove any 
researcher to attempt to combine these various aspects when possible. 
The current study, then, plans to examine the performance of individuals with mild MR, 
normal controls, and analog (i.e., simulated) malingerers on common malingering measures, 
namely the TOMM, the MFIT, and the RDCT. Additionally, with the benefits offered by the 
BGT, and specifically by the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems, in relation to malingering 
detection, the performance of individuals with mild MR in comparison to normal controls and 
analog malingerers will be explored on this measure. With the BGT having been at least 
moderately correlated with intelligence, and with this correlation increasing at the lower ranges 
of the IQ spectrum (Koppitz, 1975), this measure might provide a screening device uniquely 
appropriate for individuals with MR and/or below-average IQ in addition to those persons with 
average or above-average intelligence. Previous research (e.g., Bash & Alpert, 1980; Bruhn & 
Reed, 1975; Schretlen, 1988, 1990) has shown promising results, but replication and expansion 
are necessary, especially with a more-standardized and well-known scoring procedure, and in 
individuals with mild as opposed to more-severe MR. 
Finally, given that higher intelligence has been correlated with improved ability to 
malinger psychopathology (Pelfrey, 2004), more work is needed in exploring the relationship 
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between intelligence and performance on cognitive disability malingering measures. The present 
study, then, will attempt to examine the performances of high- versus low-cognitive ability 
analog malingerers on the TOMM, MFIT, RDCT, and BGT when instructed to feign mental 
retardation. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Question 1: How will high-cognitive ability simulated malingerers perform 
compared to low-cognitive ability simulated malingerers? 
   Hypothesis 1a: It is hypothesized that high-cognitive ability malingerers 
will commit significantly fewer errors on the BGT under both the Koppitz and Lacks scoring 
systems than will low-cognitive ability malingerers. 
   Hypothesis 1b: It is hypothesized that high-cognitive ability malingerers 
will perform significantly better (i.e., produce fewer errors in Trial 2) on the TOMM than low-
cognitive ability malingerers. 
   Hypothesis 1c: It is hypothesized that high-cognitive ability malingerers 
will perform significantly better (i.e., respond more quickly and produce fewer errors) on the 
RDCT than will low-cognitive ability malingerers. 
   Hypothesis 1d: It is hypothesized that high-cognitive ability malingerers 
will perform significantly better (i.e., remember more items) on the MFIT than will low-
cognitive ability malingerers. 
  Question 2: How will analog malingerers perform on the Bender Gestalt Test 
when compared to normal controls and individuals with mild mental retardation? 
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   Hypothesis 2a: It is hypothesized that analog malingerers will commit 
significantly more errors on the BGT under both the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems than 
will individuals with mental retardation. 
   Hypothesis 2b: It is hypothesized that analog malingerers will commit 
significantly more errors on the BGT under both the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems than 
will normal controls. 
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Method 
 Participants. A power analysis for alpha = .05 and power = .8 indicates that in order to 
obtain an effect size d = .5 with five groups and six response variables (Lacks score, Koppitz 
score, TOMM trial 2 score, RDCT total time and total errors, and MFIT score), a total sample 
size of 100 is recommended. Dividing this between the various conditions provides a cell size of 
n = 20 for each.  
 High- and Low-Cognitive Ability Malingerers and Controls. Individuals were 
recruited from undergraduate Psychology classes at Louisiana State University via the PSYC 
Experiments internet-based recruiting system. The experiment was open to all current students, 
and contained the following description: 
Eligible students (18+ years old, no current psychological diagnosis, and 
no pending major litigation/legal issues) will be asked to complete a 
variety of tasks examining areas such as memory, vocabulary, and 
perceptual abilities.  
The session will take place in the basement of Johnston Hall (room 33) at 
the Psychological Services Center, and should last approximately 45-60 
minutes. 
 
LSU student volunteers received two points of research credit for their participation. As 
is seen in the above recruitment message, all participants were screened for the exclusionary 
criteria of current psychological diagnosis, age less than 18 years, and current involvement in 
major (i.e., anything beyond a minor traffic offense such as a speeding ticket) litigation. 
Individuals in both the high- and low-cognitive ability groups were randomly divided into either 
the malingering or control condition before beginning the experiment. 
In total, 79 participants were recruited in this manner, with six being dismissed due to 
existing psychological diagnosis, resulting in a final sample of 73 students. The sample consisted 
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of  25 males and 48 females with the following self-reported ethnicities: 21 Caucasians; 9 
African-Americans, 5 Asians, and 2 Hispanics. The mean cognitive ability level, as measured by 
PPVT-IIIB scores, was 108.4 (SD = 10.2). The mean age was 20.5 years (SD = 3.7) and the 
mean years of education completed was 13.2 (SD = 1.1). 
Because of the difficulty experienced in recruiting individuals with a below-average 
PPVT-IIIB score, which was used as an estimate of overall cognitive ability, a median split was 
conducted in order to determine group membership. The median PPVT-IIIB score was 
determined to be 109; thus, individuals with scores of 109 and above were designated as part of 
the high-ability condition, and individuals with scores of 108 and below were designated as part 
of the low-ability condition. This resulted in group sizes of 18 for low-ability malingerers, 20 for 
high-ability malingerers, 16 for low-ability controls, and 19 for high-ability controls. See Table 1 
for the number of males and females, ehtnicities, mean ages, mean years of education completed, 
and mean PPVT-IIIB scores for each of the high- and low-ability groups.  
 Individuals with Mental Retardation. Individuals with mild mental retardation 
were recruited from community housing on the campus of a large civil and forensic facility 
located in eastern Louisiana. Eligible participants (i.e., those diagnosed with mild mental 
retardation) were identified by staff, and were approached by the principle investigator in the 
presence of at least one staff member. Participation was on a voluntary basis, and those 
individuals who completed testing were paid $10 for their time. In total, 11 participants were 
selected, none of whom were dismissed or excluded. Brief records reviews revealed a mean 
WAIS-III IQ of 61.1 (SD = 3.6), mean age of 38 (SD = 7.9), and mean years of education 
completed of 10.8 (SD = 1.9). The mean PPVT-IIIB score for this group was 48.4 (SD = 11.8). 
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Of the 11 individuals, four were female and seven were male, with ten being African-American 
and one being Caucasian. 
 Measures. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants per one of two 
standardized consent forms prior to inclusion in the study, with one form used for LSU students 
(see Appendix A), and the other for individuals with mild mental retardation (see Appendix B). 
For individuals with mental retardation, additional steps were taken to ensure that proper consent 
was obtained. These steps included additional explanation of the consenting procedure, reading 
aloud of the consent form, and verification through staff that each individual was a competent 
major. The following tests were administered to all participants: 
  Structured Interview: A brief structured interview was developed and 
administered in order to obtain demographic information regarding age, race, years of education 
completed, current psychological diagnoses, and current involvement in major litigation. For 
individuals with mild MR, this information was verified via records review to ensure correctness. 
See Appendix C.  
  Bender Gestalt Test (BGT): The Bender Gestalt Test, as previously described, 
was administered to all participants. Because the administration instructions are not thoroughly 
or rigorously standardized, and are similar in both the Lacks and Kopptiz systems, those 
procedures detailed by Lacks (1984) were used in presentation of the nine individual stimulus 
cards. To aid in standardization, no behavioral observations were recorded, as neither system 
officially scores such observations. Total error scores using both the Lacks and Koppitz criteria 
were coded and recorded, along with the time required to complete each design. 
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  Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM): The TOMM consists of 50 line 
drawings of common objects. Respondents are shown each object for three seconds, and are then 
presented with 50 forced-choice recognition items consisting of one correct response and one 
foil. After each item, respondents are provided with feedback regarding the correctness of their 
responses. Once the first trial is finished, a second is administered immediately afterwards; an 
optional retention trial can also be given after a 15-minute delay. A cutoff of < 45 correct 
responses on either Trial 2 or the delayed retention trial is recommended as an indication of 
suspect effort (Weinborn et al., 2003; Tombaugh, 1996). The TOMM has been shown to be 
resistant to effects of age, education, depression, and many neurological conditions sans a 
moderate or greater level of dementia (Weinborn et al., 2003). Vallabhajosula and van Gorp 
(2001) have also specifically mentioned the TOMM as adequately meeting the demands of the 
Daubert standard (in Weinborn et al., 2003). Its effectiveness has been supported in psychiatric 
forensic settings (Weinborn et al., 2003), and its sensitivity and specificity have been compared 
to that of the Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, Allen, & Astner, 1996), with findings declaring 
it to be highly specific if only moderately sensitive at base rates of malingering ranging from 
10% to 70% (O’Bryant & Lucas, 2006). Additionally, in a search of published state and federal 
case law resources, the TOMM was one of only four tests of cognitive malingering mentioned 
specifically by name (Mossman, 2003). The TOMM has also been used in MR samples, with 
varying degrees of success (Hurley & Deal, 2006; Simon, 2007). Thus, its use in a variety of 
settings seems both valid and acceptable. 
 In this study, the TOMM was administered per standard instructions (Tombaugh, 1996). 
Only Trials 1 and 2 were given; the retention trial was not be used. Total number of correct 
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responses on Trials 1 and 2 were recorded for further analysis. However, as the manual only 
recommends the use of Trial 2 in determining suspect effort, only Trial 2 scores will be analyzed 
in this study. 
  Rey Dot-Counting Test (RDCT): The RDCT, as described by Lezak (1995), is a 
simple, straight-forward task designed to assess the validity of ―general cognitive impairment or 
specific visuoperceptual defects.‖ It consists of 12 cards, each containing different numbers of 
dots. The first six cards contain ungrouped dots, and the final six contain dots grouped in various 
ways. Participants are asked to count the number of dots on each card as quickly and accurately 
as possible, with the examiner recording response time and number of dots counted for each 
card. Lezak (1983) proposed cut-offs of 4.8 seconds for mean grouped dot-counting time, and a 
mean grouped dot counting time that was not at least twice as fast as mean ungrouped dot 
counting time (in Boone, Savodnik, Ghaffarian, Lee, Freeman, & Berman, 1995). Boone, Lu, 
Back, King, Lee, Philpott, Shamieh, & Warner-Chacon (2002, in Nelson et al., 2003) suggested 
the use of a combination score consisting of mean grouped time, mean ungrouped time, and 
number of errors. Sensitivity and specificity for this method were reported to be 75-100% and 
≥90%, respectively (Boone, et al., 2002; in Nelson et al., 2003). Paul, Franzen, Cohen, and 
Fremouw (1992; in Hurley & Deal, 2006) put forth a cut-off of greater than 180 seconds total 
time required as indicative of inadequate effort, which was later validated in a population of 
individuals with mental retardation (Hurley & Deal, 2006). Indirect support for use of time rather 
than errors made in certain circumstances also exists, as mentally retarded individuals attempting 
to malinger actually produced fewer errors than did non-malingering mentally retarded 
individuals (Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1997). Finally, the RDCT has been shown to be resistant to 
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the effects of depression (Lee et al., 2000), and to generally provide acceptable levels of 
incremental validity in a malingering detection battery (Nelson et al., 2003). 
 In this study, the RDCT was administered to participants per standard instructions 
(Lezak, 1995). The number of dots counted per card, as well as total time required per card, were 
recorded. From these, a total error score (i.e., number of cards incorrectly counted) and an 
overall total time were determined and used in further analyses. See Appendix D. 
  Memory for Fifteen Items Test (MFIT): The MFIT consists of a single stimulus 
card on which fifteen items (five rows of three items each) are printed. Examinees are told that 
they will be shown the card for ten seconds, after which it will be withdrawn and they must 
reproduce as many of the items as possible from memory. They are then given a blank piece of 8 
½‖ x 11‖ paper to make their reproduction, and the test is begun.  
Like the TOMM, the MFIT is based on the premise of appearing very difficult while in 
actuality being quite easy to complete (Lezak, 1995). However, despite its simple, straight-
forward administration and scoring (generally only the raw number of missed or incorrectly 
recalled characters is recorded), there has been controversy regarding an appropriate cut-off 
score. Lezak (1983), in her review of MFIT literature, suggested a cut-off of recalling fewer than 
three of the five complete character sets (nine items total). This cut-off was later supported, after 
modification to fewer than nine total items recalled rather than three complete character sets, 
when applied to psychiatric and mentally retarded inpatients (Goldberg & Miller, 1986), brain-
damaged and comparison groups (Bernard & Fowler, 1990), criminal defendants referred for 
inpatient forensic evaluation (Simon, 1994), and in differentiating TBI subjects from probable 
malingerers (Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994), and has been found resistant to the effects of 
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depression (Lee, Boone, Lesser, Wohl, Wilkins, & Parks, 2000). A meta-analysis of 13 studies 
reporting MFIT data suggested that with a cut-off of nine, the measure has low sensitivity but 
high specificity (90%) when excluding individuals with mental retardation (Reznek, 2005). On 
occasion, cut-off scores above eight items correct have been suggested, although these results 
were reported in only small sample sizes (Taylor, Kreutzer, & West, 2003). The MFIT has also 
been shown to provide incremental validity when included among a battery designed for 
malingering detection (Nelson, Boone, Dueck, Wagener, Lu, & Grills, 2003), which is important 
considering the breadth of literature suggesting the use of multiple tests rather than a single 
measure for such tasks (Bash & Alpert, 1980; Heaton et al., 1978). While different versions of 
the measure have been developed (e.g., Fisher & Rose, 2004; Griffin, Glassmire, Henderson, & 
McCann, 1997), the original MFIT still appears to be the most popular variant (Kreznek, 2005; 
Taylor, Kreutzer, & West, 2003).  
In this study, the MFIT was administered per standard instructions (Lezak, 1995). The 
only value recorded was the total number of figures correctly recalled. As per previous research 
and recommendations (e.g., Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1997; Lezak, 1995), a cut-off score of <8 
rather than <9 total correctly-recalled items will be used as an identifier for suspect effort. See 
Appendix E. 
  Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—3rd Edition (PPVT-III): The PPVT-III is a 
brief test of ―receptive vocabulary over a wide age range using a very nonthreatening approach,‖ 
consisting of two alternate and parallel forms (Form IIIA and Form IIIB) of 204 items each 
(Williams & Wang, 1997). The forms displayed excellent coefficient alpha (.92 to .98, median 
.95) and split-half (.86 to .97, median .94) reliabilities across 25 different age group categories. 
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Coefficients of equivalence between the two forms were also high, ranging from .88 to .96, with 
a median of .94 across age groups. Test-retest stability coefficients ranged from .91 to .94 across 
a delay interval of between 8 and 203 days, mean 42 days. Correlations in adults between the 
PPVT-III and the Kaufman Adolescent & Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1993), a measure of general intelligence, were .76 (Form IIIA) and .85 (Form IIIB) for Fluid IQ, 
.87 (Form IIIA) and .91 (Form IIIB) for Crystallized IQ, and .85 (Form IIIA) and .91 (Form IIIB) 
for Composite IQ.  
 The standardization sample for the PPVT-III was demographically balanced across a 
variety of categories (age, race/ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, geographic region, and 
level of education) to match, as closely as possible, data from the Current Population Survey, 
March 1994 conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Williams 
& Wang, 1997). Additionally, the PPVT-III was validated with a variety of special populations, 
including children/adolescents (N=44) and adults (N=41) with mild mental retardation. Average 
scores for these groups ranged from 59.3 (Form IIIA) and 58.5 (Form IIIB) in adults to 75.2 
(Form IIIA) and 74.4 (Form IIIB) in children/adolescents.  
 As previously noted, the PPVT-III consists of 204 test items, each with its own 
accompanying illustration page in the test booklet. The illustration pages are divided into 
quarters, with a separate line drawing portrayed in each quadrant. The test items are read aloud to 
the examinee one at a time, and after each item the examinee is asked to choose, via pointing to 
the design or saying aloud its number, which illustration best defines or shows the meaning of 
the test item. Research has shown that the PPVT-III has been effectively used with children with 
Down Syndrome (Fidler, Most, & Guiberson, 2005) and Autism (Condouris, Meyer, & Tager-
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Flusberg, 2003). Additionally, while the PPVT-III tends to underestimate full-scale WAIS-III IQ 
scores above the High Average range, it accurately estimates full-scale IQ in the Average and 
High Average ranges and is related to full-scale and verbal IQ overall (Bell, Lassiter, Matthews, 
& Hutchinson, 2001). Finally, the PPVT-III has successfully been used to screen cognitive 
abilities in adults with developmental disabilities residing in state care facilities, showing strong 
correlations with both the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test and the Wide Range Achievement 
Test—3rd Edition, with correlations ranging from .72 to .92 (Powell, Plamaondon, & Retzlaff, 
2002). It was felt that the PPVT-III would be the most easily-administered and appropriate brief 
screening device to use in this study, given that many of the individuals with mild MR might be 
illiterate, or have difficulty with other, popular screening devices, such as the Wechsler Test of 
Adult Reading, that require reading words aloud. 
 In this study, the PPVT-III, form B, was administered and scored per standard 
instructions to produce a scaled score that was used as an estimate of cognitive ability. 
  Subject Rating Scale: A subject rating scale, adapted from that used by 
Tombaugh (1996), was administered to all participants in the two malingering conditions. It 
asked the participant how much effort they put into their faking attempt, and how successful they 
felt they were in faking mental retardation. Both questions were rated on a 5-point Likert scale. 
See Appendix F. 
 Design and Procedure 
  High- and Low-Cognitive Ability Malingerers: All malingerers were first given 
the informed consent form to explain the confidentiality of their participation and responses. 
Participants’ names were recorded on this form only, after which they were randomly assigned 
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an identification number for use on all subsequent records. Participants were then administered 
the structured interview, and any individuals meeting exclusion criteria were thanked for their 
time and dismissed, while also receiving research credit for signing up. For individuals who met 
inclusion criteria, the PPVT-III form B was administered per standard instructions. Participants 
then received the following set of instructions, adapted from those used by Tombaugh (1996), 
regarding the tests that are to come, and how they are to perform: 
In this study, you will be asked to complete a variety of tasks. These tasks 
are often included in test batteries that examine whether or not a person suffers 
from some level of mental impairment.  
As you take each test, I would like you to assume the role of someone who 
has been convicted of first-degree murder, and that in your case, the death penalty 
has been recommended. Your lawyer has advised you of a recent Supreme Court 
decision that if you are mentally retarded, the court cannot sentence you to death.  
Your job today is to try to respond on the tests in a way that will convince 
the tester that you have mild mental retardation. Keep in mind that if you do not 
succeed in this deception, you will likely receive the death penalty. Also, be 
aware that with such a serious charge, there will be the suspicion that people 
might try to fake intellectual disability to avoid the death penalty. This means that 
your responses must be believable. Major exaggerations, such as not being able to 
do anything, remembering absolutely nothing, or completely failing to respond, 
are easy to detect. 
 
Following these instructions, participants were administered the Bender Gestalt Test, the MFIT, 
the first two trials of the TOMM, and finally the RDCT, in fixed order. Participants were then 
given the subject rating scale, thanked for their time, allowed the opportunity to ask questions 
regarding the experiment, and dismissed. Results of the various assessments were then 
calculated. Additionally, it was planned that any individual indicating, via the participant rating 
scale, to have not put forth at least an ―average‖ amount of effort (score of three or greater on 
question two of the rating scale) would not have their results included in the final analyses. 
However, no participants were excluded based on this effort factor. 
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  High- and Low-Cognitive Ability Controls: The same procedures as those used 
for high- and low-ability malingerers were followed for high- and low-ability controls, with the 
exception of the instructions given. The following, non-malingering instructions were used 
instead: 
In this study, you will be asked to complete a variety of tasks. These tasks 
are often included in test batteries that examine whether or not a person suffers 
from some level of mental impairment.  
As you take each test, I would like you to perform to the best of your 
ability. That is, just try your hardest on each of the different tasks that you are 
given. 
 
 Individuals with Mental Retardation: The same procedures and instructions 
used for the two control groups were used for individuals with mental retardation, with the 
exception of testing location. For high- and low-ability participants, all testing occurred at the 
Psychological Services Center of LSU in Johnston Hall. For mild MR participants, testing 
occurred on their homes/units, which were located on the campus of a large civil and forensic 
state-run mental health facility in eastern Louisiana. Additional explanation of the instructions 
and the various tasks were given as necessary. Only those individuals who had previous 
documentation of having met DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria standards for mild Mental 
Retardation were included in this sample. Consent was obtained from the participant directly in 
all instances, as all MR participants were competent majors. At the conclusion of the testing, as 
with the high- and low-ability controls, participants were allowed to asked questions, provided 
with their $10 compensation, thanked for their time, and dismissed.  
All other measures of this study (BGT, MFIT, TOMM, RDCT, and subject rating scale) 
were given as per the high- and low-ability conditions. The instructions used, as noted, were 
identical to those received by the control groups. 
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Results 
 Demographic Analysis: To examine equivalence across groups on demographic 
variables (i.e., age, education, sex, and ethnicity) and PPVT-IIIB scores, various analyses were 
run. A one-way, between-groups ANOVA revealed significant differences on age, F(4,79) = 
38.6, p<.001, years of education completed, F(4,79) = 9.3, p<.001, and PPVT-IIIB scores, 
F(4,79) = 180.7, p<.001. Post-hoc testing in the form of Tukey’s HSD revealed that for both age 
and years of education, the mild MR group differed significantly from all other groups (low- and 
high-ability malingerers and low- and high-ability controls), while none of the non-MR groups 
significantly differed from one another. In relation to PPVT-IIIB scores, the two low-ability 
groups (malingering and control) did not differ from one another, nor did the two high-ability 
groups (malingering and control) differ from one another. However, both low-ability groups 
differed significant from both high-ability groups, and all groups differed significantly from the 
mild MR group. See Table 2.  
 Multiple independent samples t-tests, with alpha set at .005 to control for experiment-
wise error rates (.05/10 = .005), were run to determine if groups differed in terms of sex and 
ethnicity. The results revealed that no groups differed from one another significantly in relation 
to gender, and the high- and low-congitive ability malingerers and controls did not differ 
significantly from one another on either characteristic. However, the mild MR group did 
significantly differ in terms of race from high-ability malingerers, t (29) = -3.12, p = .003, and 
high-ability controls, t (28) = 3.96, p < .001. See Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
 
Demographic 
Characteristic 
 
Low-Ability 
Malingerers 
(N=18) 
High-Ability 
Malingerers 
(N=20) 
Low-Ability 
Controls 
(N=16) 
High-Ability 
Controls 
(N=19) 
Mild Mental 
Retardation 
(N=11) 
 
Mean Age, 
Years (SD) 
 
 
21.06 (2.56)
 
 
19.50 (1.10)
 
 
21.94 (7.06)
 
 
19.84 (1.50)
 
 
38.09 (7.92)
* 
Mean 
Education, 
Years (SD) 
 
13.39 (1.09) 13.00(.92) 13.19 (1.10) 13.21 (1.23) 10.82 (1.89)
* 
Sex 
 
M = 5 
F = 13 
 
M = 7 
F = 13 
M = 6 
F = 10 
M = 7 
F = 12 
M = 7 
F = 4 
Ethnicity 
 
Cauc. = 14 
Afr. Am. = 3 
Asian = 0 
Hispanic = 1 
Cauc. = 18 
Afr. Am. = 1 
Asian = 0 
Hispanic = 1 
Cauc. = 9 
Afr. Am. = 3 
Asian = 4 
Hispanic = 0 
Cauc. = 16 
Afr. Am. = 2 
Asian = 1 
Hispanic = 0 
Cauc. = 1
* 
Afr. Am. = 10
* 
Asian = 0 
Hispanic = 0 
Mean PPVT-
IIIB Score 
(SD) 
 
100.67 (5.56)
a 
115.40 (6.02)
b 
98.88 (6.45)
a 
116.21 (7.61)
b 
48.36(11.79)
c 
*
Indicates a value that is significantly different (p < .005) from every other value in that row 
abc 
Values with identical superscript characters are not significantly different (p < .005) from one another 
 
 Hypothesis 1: To test hypothesis 1 (1a through 1d), a between-subjects MANOVA using 
group membership (high-cognitive ability malingerer and low-cognitive ability malingerer) as 
the independent variable, and Koppitz score, Lacks score, TOMM raw score, MFIT number 
correct, RDCT total time, and RDCT number of errors as the dependent variables, was initially 
proposed. However, upon further analysis and review of the data, it was determined that a 
MANOVA would be inappropriate, as none of the variables included was normally-distributed. 
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Thus, the nonparametric procedure of a Mann-Whitney U test was chosen to examine differences 
in performances on these measures between independent groups.  
 While the hypothesis itself would suggest the use of 1-tailed significance testing, based 
on the exploratory nature of this study, it was decided to instead examine the 2-tailed results. In 
contrast to the literature, it was felt that low-ability malingerers might actually have been more 
successful at malingering, given that they function intellectually in a range closer to MR than do 
high-ability malingerers. However, the tests revealed no significant differences between high- 
and low-ability malingerers on any of the experimental measures. See Table 3. 
Table 3 
Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Malingerers on the BGT, TOMM, RDCT, and MFIT (N 
= 38) 
 
 Koppitz 
Score 
Lacks 
Score 
MFIT 
Score 
TOMM 
Trial 2 
Score 
RDCT 
Total Time 
RDCT 
Total 
Errors 
 
Z value 
 
 
-1.18 
 
-.93 
 
-.33 
 
-.75 
 
-.95 
 
-.97 
Significance 
 
.24 .35 .75 .45 .34 .33 
  
Low-Cognitive Ability Malingerers (n = 18) 
 
 
Mean Rank  
 
21.72 21.22 18.89 18.08 17.69 21.33 
  
High-Cognitive Ability Malingerers (n = 20) 
 
 
Mean Rank  
 
17.50 17.95 20.05 20.78 21.13 17.85 
 
Hypothesis 2: To test hypothesis 2 (both 2a and 2b), a between-subjects MANOVA, 
using collapsed group membership (malingerer, control, mild MR) as the independent variable 
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and the Koppitz and Lacks scoring system results for these groups as the dependent variables. 
The collapsing of the high- and low-malingering groups was not felt to confound the results, as 
the two groups—as previously mentioned—did not differ significantly in their malingering 
performances. 
However, as with hypothesis 1, it was determined that a MANOVA would be 
inappropriate due to the non-normality of the dependent variables. As such, a nonparametric, K-
samples Kurskal-Wallis Test was run. The test was significant for both the Koppitz score, ²(2, 
N = 84) = 57.95, p < .001, and the Lacks score, ²(2, N = 84) = 64.75, p < .001.  
Follow-up tests in the form of Mann-Whitney U tests, were conducted to examine the 
pairwise differences between groups. See Table 4. 
Hypothesis 2a: The results of the pairwise tests indicated that mild MR 
participants performed significantly worse (i.e., produced more errors) than did malingerers on 
the Lacks score, z = -3.57, p < .001, but not on the Koppitz score, z = -1.61, p = .108. Mean ranks 
for mild MR participants on the Lacks and Koppitz scores were 38.27 and 31.05, respectively. 
Mean ranks for malingerers were 21.16 on the Lacks scores and 23.25 on the Koppitz score. 
Hypothesis 2b: According to the Mann-Witney U Test, malingerers performed 
significantly worse than did controls on both the Lacks score, z = -7.33, p < .001, and the 
Koppitz score, z = -7.06, p < .001. Mean ranks for the controls were 18.34 on the Lacks scores 
and 19.00 on the Koppitz score. Mean ranks for malingerers were 54.18 on the Lacks score and 
53.58 on the Koppitz score. 
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Table 4 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test Results for the TOMM, MFIT, and RDCT 
 
  
  MFIT 
Score 
TOMM Trial 
2 Score 
RDCT 
Total Time 
RDCT Total 
Errors 
 
  
Malingerers vs. Controls (N = 75) 
 
Z value 
 
 -6.32
** 
-6.34
** 
-6.52
** 
-5.98
** 
 
Significance  .000 .000 .000 .000  
  
Malingerers vs. Mild MR (N = 46) 
 
Z value 
 
 -1.90 -1.72 -.53 -2.59
* 
 
Significance  .057 .086 .598 .010  
  
Controls vs. Mild MR (N = 49) 
 
Z value 
 
 -6.42
** 
-5.46
** 
.4.92
** 
-2.08
** 
 
Significance  .000 .000 .000 .000  
*
 Denotes a difference significant at the p < .05 level 
**
 Denotes a difference significant at the p < .001 level 
 
Unproposed Analyses: As an additional, exploratory analysis not listed in the initial 
thesis proposal, results were obtained in order to compare the performance of mild MR 
participants with controls and malingerers on the TOMM trial 2, RDCT, and MFIT. As with the 
previous analyses, parametric tests were deemed inappropriate due to the nonnormality of the 
dependent variables. Instead, a Kurskal-Wallis Test was run to explore for significant differences 
between the three participant groups. Results for the test were significant for the TOMM trial 2, 
²(2, N = 84) = 49.08, p < .001, the MFIT, ²(2, N = 84) = 43.25, p < .001, the RDCT total time, 
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²(2, N = 84) = 50.51, p < .001, and the RDCT total number incorrect, ²(2, N = 84) = 37.30, p < 
.001. 
 Follow-up tests in the form of Mann-Whitney U Tests were conducted to examine 
pairwise differences. Results indicated significantly worse performance by malingerers 
compared to controls on all four measures (TOMM trial 2, MFIT, RDCT total time, and RDCT 
total number incorrect), significantly worse performance by malingerers compared to individuals 
with mild MR on RDCT total number of errors, and significantly worse performance by 
individuals with mild MR compared to controls on the TOMM trial 2, the MFIT, and RDCT total 
time. Results are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Identifications and Misidentifications of Participants Using Recommended Cut-Scores for 
the TOMM, MFIT, and RDCT 
 
 
Experimental Group 
Membership 
 
Classification Based on Measure 
 
Malingerer Non-malingerer % Misidentified 
  
MFIT < 8 Recalled 
(Sensitivity = 36%, Specificity = 83%) 
 
Malingerer 
(n = 38) 
 
 
14 
 
 
24 
 
 
63% 
 
Control 
(n = 35) 
0 35 0% 
 
Mild MR 
(n = 11) 
 
 
8 
 
4 
 
73% 
  
TOMM Trial 2 Score < 45 
(Sensitivity = 68%, Specificity = 91%) 
 
Malingerer 
(n = 38) 
 
 
26 
 
 
12 
 
 
32% 
 
Control 
(n = 35) 
 
0 35 0% 
Mild MR 
(n = 11) 
 
4 8 36% 
  
RDCT Total Time > 180 seconds 
(Sensitivity = 18%; Specificity = 83%) 
 
Malingerer 
(n = 38) 
 
 
7 
 
 
31 
 
 
82% 
 
Control 
(n = 35) 
 
0 35 0% 
Mild MR 
(n = 11) 
 
0 11 0% 
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Discussion 
 The malingering of cognitive disabilities and psychopathology in a forensic setting 
carries with it significant financial and societal costs. Successful malingerers might be found 
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby escaping significant 
punishment. Additionally, those individuals found incompetent would be further evaluated in an 
effort to restore them to competence, and thus would artificially inflate costs required for such 
programs. Given the recent Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the need to 
identify potential malingerers, especially in relation to mental retardation, is greater now than 
ever. However, along with this need for the identification of malingering comes the need to 
ascertain the appropriateness of effort tests in the mentally retarded population. With previous 
research having identified potential problems in using such popular measures as the MMPI-2 
(Keyes, 2004) and the TOMM (Hurley & Deal, 2006) in the assessment of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, much work remains to be done to determine which tools are, in fact, 
suited for this population. The aim of the current study was to examine the performance of 
individuals with mild mental retardation, in comparison to analog malingerers and effortful 
responders, on many popular malingering scales. An additional goal was to explore the effects of 
high- versus low-cognitive ability as a factor of performance on cognitive ability effort tests, 
given that previous research has shown higher intelligence to be associated with more success in 
malingering psychopathology (Pelfrey, 2004). 
 This study made use of the simulation design of malingering, as explained by Rogers 
(1997), in which individuals are instructed to purposefully feign a specific impairment—in this 
case mild mental retardation—and are compared to effortful responders (i.e., controls) and 
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clinical groups with genuine disorders. This type of design allows for maximum experimental 
control, while decreasing generalizability of results. Given the exploratory nature of the study, 
and of this pilot use of the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems for the Bender Gestalt in the 
assessment of malingering, the control-for-generalizability trade-off was deemed appropriate and 
necessary.  
Internal validity was felt to have been achieved by randomly assigning non-MR 
participants to the various malingering and control groups. The statistical demographic analysis 
supported this idea, as there were no significant differences between the non-MR groups in 
relation to any of the demographic factors. However, given that all non-MR participants were 
students attending LSU, they likely would not be representative of many other groups, such as 
older individuals, or people with fewer years of education. Additionally, the mild MR group was 
significantly different from high- and low-cognitive ability malingerers in terms of race, with the 
MR group having a significantly larger proportion of African-Americans, and a significantly 
smaller proportion of Caucasians. Given this finding, comparisons between individuals with 
mental retardation and high-ability malingerers and controls cannot be fully attributed to the 
experimental conditions (i.e., effortful malingering vs. effortful responding), and is instead 
confounded by race.  
 Also, it was originally hoped to have recruited a mild MR sample in which no individuals 
carried comorbid psychiatric or personality disorders. However, securing such a sample proved 
to be exceedingly difficult, and resulted in ten of the eleven mild MR participants being accepted 
despite dually-diagnosed psychological conditions. Thus, internal validity is further 
compromised with respect to the attribution of causality of performance (i.e., it is difficult to 
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attribute the performance of mild MR individuals to the fact that they are MR as opposed to the 
effects other psychological disorders), although external validity and the applicability of these 
results to real-world settings might consequently be improved. 
 Examining the results of the study first in relation to hypothesis 1, it was found that there 
were no significant differences in performance on any of the included effort measures between 
malingerers with high vs. low cognitive ability. Thus, hypothesis 1 (parts 1a through 1d) was 
proven false. It must be noted that the small difference in estimated cognitive abilities (PPVT-
IIIB scores) between these two groups, due to the use of a median split and the difficulty in 
recruiting low-ability participants, could be at least partially responsible for this lack of a 
difference in malingering performance. While the low-ability groups were significantly below 
the high-ability groups in terms of cognitive ability, the split between them was not as large as 
had originally been hoped for. However, these results did allow for the collapsing of the high- 
and low-ability malingerers into a single malingering group during subsequent analyses.  
 Exploring the results of hypothesis 2, it was seen that malingerers performed significantly 
worse on the Koppitz and Lacks scores for the BGT than did controls, thus supporting hypothesis 
2a. However, with respect to hypothesis 2b, mild MR participants performed similarly to 
malingerers on the Koppitz scores, while actually performing worse on the Lacks scores. MR 
participants thus exhibited results opposite to what were expected, thereby providing no support 
for hypothesis 2b. 
 In terms of the exploratory, unproposed and unhypothesized analyses, more-promising 
outcomes were existent. As would have been expected, malingerers performed significantly 
worse than controls on all of the common malingering measures (TOMM trial 2, MFIT, and 
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RDCT). Of greater interest is the fact that malingerers also performed significantly worse than 
individuals with mild mental retardation on one measure—the total number of incorrect 
responses to the RDCT. Also of note would be the finding that individuals with mild MR 
performed significantly worse than controls on all measures other than RDCT total number of 
incorrect responses. These results would suggest that total number of errors on the RDCT might 
prove to be a useful indicator of suspect effort in individuals thought to be malingering mild 
mental retardation. Additionally, the data caution that individuals with MR perform worse on 
common effort tests than do healthy controls. 
 In order to identify the extent to which this lowered performance by individuals with mild 
MR might lead to misclassification using the TOMM, MFIT, and RDCT, standard cut-offs for 
suspect effort (fewer than 45 correct responses on TOMM trial 2, 8 or fewer items remembered 
on the MFIT, and greater than 180 seconds total to finish the RDCT), as identified in prior 
research and testing manuals, were used to determine sensitivity (true positives/[true positives + 
false negatives]) and specificity (true negatives/[true negatives + false positives]) (Hayes, Hale, 
& Gouvier, 1997; Paul et al., 1992; Tommbaugh, 1996) values. Manual examination of the data 
yielded the results shown in Table 6. At first glance, all three measures would appear acceptable 
or near-acceptable in terms of sensitivity and specificity, with only the MFIT crossing below 
90% specificity, and the TOMM trial 2 having a rather strong sensitivity of 68%. However, 
given that all false positives occurred in the mild MR sample, the outcome is a bit more sobering, 
with the TOMM having misidentified 36% and the MFIT having misidentified 72% of effortful 
mild MR responders as potentially malingering. Commensurate with previous research, only the 
RDCT total time variable provided an acceptable level of specificity (100%) in the mild MR 
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group, while conversely displaying the lowest sensitivity (Hurley & Deal, 2006). Thus, the 
results of this study support the notion that only RDCT total time is appropriate for use in mild 
MR populations, with MFIT and TOMM trial 2 cut-off scores misclassifying unacceptably high 
levels of intellectually disabled individuals. 
 Further review of these data would suggest that the usefulness of the Koppitz and Lacks 
systems in differentiating genuine mental retardation from malingered cognitive deficit to be 
very limited. Poor performance on either measure would, based upon the results of this study, 
suggest only that an individual—in comparison to normal controls—is either potentially mildly 
mentally retarded or malingering, and as such would be of little use in the differentiation of 
malingered and genuine intellectual disability. 
 Future directions to be taken could explore the results of this study further, especially in 
relation to the trends uncovered in the unproposed/additional analyses. Given that malingerers 
produced significantly greater numbers of errors than individuals with mild MR, developing a 
cut-off score for these errors as an identifier of suspect effort might be a possibility. 
 Also, given the success had by Bash and Alpert (1980), and later by Schretlen (1988, 
1990) in using their set of malingering criteria on the Bender Gestalt, the use of this scoring 
methodology on the present study’s data set might yield promising results. Such an approach was 
initially ruled against in favor of the wider use of, familiarity with, and research base held by the 
Koppitz and Lacks systems. In light of the findings of the current study, though, the examination 
of the Schretlen (1990) criteria would now seem to be the next logical step.  
 Finally, as the sample sizes for nearly all groups were lower than the 20 individuals 
initially proposed and expected, future work could aim at replication and expansion—such as 
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with the aforementioned Schretlen malingering criteria and the RDCT total errors cut-score—of 
the current design in a larger sample. Obtaining more voluntary mild MR participants, especially 
those who are community-dwelling and without comorbid psychiatric diagnoses, might 
particularly help to increase internal validity and possibly produce more positive findings. Given 
that the current study’s participants with mild MR were housed in assisted-living facilities, their 
performances might not be representative of the mild MR population as a whole. This facet 
might also explain the poor specificity of the TOMM in relation to misclassifying mild MR 
participants as malingerers. Indeed, Simon (2007) specifically mentions community-dwelling 
versus assisted-living status as a potential reason for the disparity between his results, which 
supported the use of the TOMM in MR individuals, and those of Hurley & Dean (2006), whose 
assisted-living participants performed more similarly to those examined in the current study.  
 In conclusion, then, the Koppitz and Lacks scoring systems proved to be unsuccessful in 
potentially differentiating malingered from genuine mental retardation. However, promising 
findings were reported with respect to RDCT total time, with malingerers performing 
significantly worse than both controls and individuals with mild MR. Future studies should focus 
on increasing sample size, gathering a more-representative mild MR group, and examining the 
possible use of the Schretlen (1990) modification of Bash & Alpert’s (1980) BGT malingering 
score and establishing an RDCT cut-off value. 
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Appendix A 
 
              Louisiana State University 
Psychology 
Consent Form 
 
The Effects of Effort on Cognitive Testing Performance 
 
This study is held at the LSU Psychological Services Center and Audubon Hall on the LSU campus, and 
involves looking at how people perform on cognitive tests. Today we will ask you to complete a set of 
tasks that are often used to measure a variety of abilities in people with and without intellectual 
disabilities. By participating in this study, you will be one of about 140 other participants providing 
valuable information about how people approach these testing exercises.  
 
You will be given four separate tasks that will include tests of memory, perception, and mental speed, 
such as counting dots, remember letters, numbers, and shapes, and drawing designs. Additionally, you 
will be asked to fill out a questionnaire about general medical history, any past head injuries you might 
have had, and any current psychological difficulties you are experiencing. The testing itself should take 
about thirty to forty-five minutes and will be completed in a single session. 
 
Any individual who is at least 18 years old, has no significant history of neurological disease or seizure 
disorder, no current psychological disorder, and no pending criminal charges may take part in this study. 
LSU students who participate will be given extra credit in their psychology class. All other volunteers 
will receive $10 for their time. Participation is voluntary. While there are no risks foreseen by taking 
part in this study, you may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time without 
penalty. 
 
The researchers conducting this study have been properly trained to administer all of the tests you are 
about to take. All information will remain anonymous. Any forms containing your name or phone number 
will be kept separately from your testing data. 
 
If you have any questions please contact: 
 
Name:    Daniel Proto 
Department:  Psychology 
Phone:   (678) 480-7092 
Available: Mon. & Wed.:  1:00pm – 3:30pm 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about 
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Chairman, LSU Institutional 
Review Board, (225)578 8692. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge 
the researchers’ obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me. 
 
 
__________________________________    _____________ 
Subject Signature                Date  
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Appendix B 
       Louisiana State University 
Psychology 
Consent Form 
 
The Effects of Effort on Cognitive Testing Performance 
 
This study is held at the LSU Psychological Services Center and Audubon Hall on the LSU campus, and 
will look at how people perform on different types of mental tests. Today we will ask you to do tasks that 
look at how people think. If you join this study, you will be one of about 140 other people helping us 
learn about how people do these types of tests.  
 
We will ask you to do four tasks today that will look at how well you can remember things, how you see 
and draw shapes, and how fast you can count. This should take about an hour and we will finish 
everything today. 
 
Anyone who is 18 or older, and who does not have any neurological condition, psychological diagnosis or 
pending criminal charges can be in this study, and we will pay you $10. You do not have to do these 
things if you do not want to. You will not be harmed in this study, and you can choose not to do it or to 
stop at anytime without punishment.  
 
The people testing you know how to give all of the tests you are about to take. We will not put your name 
on any of your answers, so no one will be able to tell how you did if you do not want them to. We will 
also keep all of the forms with your name on them separate from your answers. 
 
If you have any questions please contact: 
 
Name:    Daniel Proto 
Department:  Psychology 
Phone:   (678) 480-7092 
Available: Mon. & Wed.:  1:00pm – 3:30pm 
 
The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about 
subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Chairman, LSU Institutional 
Review Board, (225)578 8692. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge 
the researchers’ obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me. 
 
 
__________________________________    _____________ 
Subject Signature                Date  
 
The study subject has indicated to me that he/she is unable to read. I certify that I have read this consent form to the 
subject and explained that by completing the signature line above, the subject has agreed to participate. 
 
__________________________________    _____________ 
Signature of Reader                Date  
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(Appendix B cont.) 
 
 
I certify that by signing below, I am indicating that as acting guardian for the subject, I consent to their participation 
in this study based on the information described in the form above. Additionally, I am indicating that assent to 
participate as been given by the subject. 
 
__________________________________    _____________ 
Signature of Guardian/Staff Member    Date   
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Appendix C 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
Subject #:______     Examiner: ____________________ 
 
 
Age: _________     (circle one): MR / Non-MR 
        
Race: ________   
 
Gender: _______ 
 
Highest grade completed: ________ 
 
 
 
Do you currently have, or have you previously had, any type of neurological disorder, for 
example epilepsy?:  Y / N   
*If yes, please explain: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Have you ever been hit on the head so hard that you blacked out?: Y / N 
*If yes, please explain: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                        
Are you currently diagnosed with any psychological disorder(s), including ADHD or 
learning disorders?: Y / N 
 
Are there any pending criminal charges against you?:  Y / N 
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Appendix D 
Memory for Fifteen Items Test 
 
 
Subject #:______     Examiner:____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Column 1 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 2 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 3 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 4 Correct: ________ 
 
Column 5 Correct: ________ 
 
Total # Correct : ____________ 
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Appendix E 
Dot Counting Test 
 
 
 
Subject #: ______     Examiner: ___________________ 
 
 
 
Card 1:   Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 2: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 3: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 4: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______  
 
Card 5: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 6: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 7: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 8: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 9: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 10: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 11: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
Card 12: Number of Dots Counted: ______   Correct: Y / N   Time (sec): ______ 
 
 
 
Total Number of Errors:   __________ 
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Appendix F 
Participant Rating Scale 
 
 
Subject #:______     Examiner: ____________________ 
 
 
 
1.)  How successful do you think you were in trying to portray someone with a brain-injury? 
(Circle one) 
      
     
Not at all  An average 
amount 
 Very 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
     
            
 
 
 
2.)  How hard did you try?  (Circle one) 
 
    
Not at all  An average 
amount 
 Very 
1 2 3 4 5 
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